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Practice, Constraint,
and Mathematical Concepts
Mark C. R. Smith
Queen’s University (Canada)
Résumé : Dans cet article je propose d’exprimer et de défendre une concep-
tion des pratiques et du domaine de discours mathématiques qui soit sensible,
d’une part, au pluralisme des relations entre pratiques inférentielles et intérêts,
et d’autre part, à la structure objective et déterminante des concepts mathé-
matiques. J’ébauche tout d’abord une caractérisation générale des pratiques,
pour ensuite préciser certains phénomènes propres aux pratiques mathéma-
tiques. Suit un recensement des idées qui se dégagent des arguments plura-
listes, et de celles qui sont à retenir. Mais je défends par la suite la nécessité
d’une forme de réalisme mathématique, qui toutefois ne peut être le réalisme
d’objets que prônent les partisans de l’argument d’indispensabilité. Je défends
plutôt un réalisme des concepts, soutenu par ce que je baptise l’« argument de
la contrainte ».
Abstract: In this piece I articulate and defend a conception of mathemati-
cal practice and mathematical subject-matter, which is responsive both to a
sensible pluralism concerning the connection between inferential practices and
guiding interests, on the one hand, and to the objective content-determining
structure of mathematical concepts on the other. I begin by sketching a general
characterization of practices themselves, and by specifying some of the unique
features of mathematical practices. An examination of inferential pluralism
follows, and some insights of pluralist arguments are retained. But I argue
further for the requirement of some form of mathematical realism, though the
object-realism of the indispensability argument is assessed and rejected. My
positive proposal argues for a form of concept-realism, which is established by
what I call the “argument from constraint.”
Philosophia Scientiæ, 16 (1), 2012, 15–28.
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Introduction
A good deal of what goes on in our ordinary lives and in our reflective theoret-
ical moments is shaped by an array of practices of various kinds—conceptual,
cultural, technological, and others—and philosophy of late has become increas-
ingly sensitive to these, in particular to their role in shaping the substructure
of normative thought in contexts of both practical and theoretical reasoning.
How we think emerges constitutively out of what we’re up to, interested in,
find salient, or simply need in virtue of being human. In the specific case
of mathematical reasoning, we might regard the very existence of multiple,
mutually incompatible derivational systems as evidence for a kind of ‘practice
pluralism’, the thesis that different forms of conceptual life—so to speak—are
bound to yield different results according to their own internal constraints of
reasoning, absent a system-external source of norms of mathematical thought.
The pluralist idea, loosely stated, is that in the context of pure mathematics,
it is practice which determines the content of at least most mathematical con-
cepts. But a large part of my argument here will be that this view is false, and
I will both motivate the negative or critical aspect of my view, and suggest an
alternative in the light of a novel argument.
Mathematical practice has some features which are distinctive. In gen-
eral a mature practice or cluster of practices can be individuated thanks to
at least these three aspects. 1 The first is that a practice is individuated by
the network of concepts in which that practice finds its place as something
meaningful and recognizable as such among a community. Call this the in-
terpretive structure into which a practice must fit. To illustrate: since I have
no interpretive structure for telling the difference between, say, people really
playing cricket and people going through some joking simulacrum of cricket,
I have no serious way of telling whether or not the practice of cricket is being
embodied or carried out by the group I’m watching. My lacking an inter-
pretive structure, such as the application criteria for the concepts of run and
wicket and so on, not only makes me an outsider with respect to the practice,
but makes me incapable of distinguishing it from an imitation or a close, but
distinct, relative. Secondly, a mature practice is something which must affect
the mental states of those who are undertaking it. In order for a practice to be
recognizable as cricket or waltzing or doing group theory, it must be part of the
participants’ self-conception that they are engaged in that very activity: there
must be first-person acknowledgement available. And thirdly, a practice must
be ‘something to which we advert in describing an activity in certain terms’,
as Thompson [Thompson 2008, 199] puts it: that is, there must be second-
and third-personal acknowledgement available—for instance of an activity as
counting as waltzing—in addition to the first-personal self-conception.
1. I borrow these three criteria loosely from Michael Thompson [Thompson 2008,
199], though the use I make of them is entirely different.
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The multiple branches of mathematics share these characteristics just as
much as do the practices of making a souﬄé, presiding over a trial, or in-
vestigating the anatomical structure of the fins of certain fish. In order to
see what is most intriguing about mathematics understood as a collection of
practices, though, we can make a further distinction among practices which
are non-truth-seeking (such as making a souﬄé), and practices like anatomical
investigation which are truth-seeking with respect to a given subject-matter.
Mathematics both pure and applied is a practice of the latter kind. But
it has the further remarkable feature that, while it is a cluster of mature
truth-seeking practices, its content is (generally) not available for empirical
inspection and its truths are not (in the general case) open to confirmation
in the face of experience.
And so my interest in what follows is in asking what the results of math-
ematical practices, so characterized, can tell us about the distinctive target-
domain of (some portion of) mathematics. My specific thesis will be that
mathematical results—at least in some significant range of cases—cannot have
their content fixed by the practices that engender them, but rather that the
direction of fit is closer to the reverse: something anterior to the practice is
what ratifies the practice itself. I will, therefore, be arguing for a kind of real-
ism, one which, as I shall explain, concerns concepts rather than objects, and
which I will try to make persuasive in light of a specific, familiar, and quite
interesting example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I will broach
the contrast between practice monism (as embodied by Michael Dummett, on
whose view there is one single correct canon of inferential procedures) and
practice pluralism (as represented by Hartry Field), and argue in favour of
retaining some insights from each of their quite different views. Part of my ar-
gument here will be that while practice pluralism is closest to the truth, plural-
ism itself offers a series of examples of how practices adjust to target-domains
and have their content fixed by those domains, rather than the reverse. But
what, precisely, is involved in speaking of a mathematical ‘target-domain’?
This is the question explored throughout section 3. In 3.1, I make the pre-
liminary case that realism of one sort or another has to be endorsed, but,
contra the indispensability argument discussed in 3.2, it cannot be a realism
vis-à-vis objects. In 3.3, I flesh out a fuller picture of my rival argument—the
argument from constraint—to motivate the beginnings of a more satisfactory,
practice-motivated realism. Finally, in section 4, I draw some conclusions and
make explicit the connection between practices, constraint, and the insights
retained from the second section.
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1 The practice of inference: harmony and
pluralism
Alternative logics, embodying alternative models of what inference can or
should be, are designed in such a way as to preserve different features for
varying purposes. While classical logic has truth-preserving inference in view,
combined (perhaps necessarily) with a realist conception of semantic values
for mathematical propositions, intuitionistic strictures on logic are meant to
preserve epistemic warrant in inference, while a paraconsistent system which
denies ‘explosion’ or ex falso quodlibet might conceivably be suitable for an
account of inferences in reasoning about the contents and structure of fictional
worlds (and there may be other uses of paraconsistency as well).
But standing against this first blush of a pluralist vision of inferential
practices, we find Michael Dummett (see especially [Dummett 1978]). The
elements of his argument are familiar but bear repeating, for they culminate
in an insight about harmony which I think is worth retaining. Begin with an
everyday sort of example about the practice of inference. Imagine that we are
speaking of someone who is now dead, and we wonder if she was courageous.
Let’s say that she was never in danger, never faced a situation in which she
might be called upon to display courage or show herself to be a coward. Is it
the case that there is some truth ‘out there’, some verification-transcendent
truth, to the proposition that she was courageous? Surely not: surely it is
the case that ‘She was courageous’ is neither true nor false. It is not that
she really was one way or the other and we’ll never know which: the issue
is that it seems that this proposition does not have a truth value at all. In
Dummett’s view, this familiar sort of observation is an indication that we
should not tether meaning to bivalent truth conditions, because the sentence
‘She was courageous’ is both meaningful and deprived of a truth value. We
can say:
(1) It is not the case that she was not courageous.
But that does not entail:
(2) She was courageous.
What we know is what would have had to have been the case in order for us
to be entitled to assert ‘She is courageous’ or ‘She showed courage on that
occasion’, but now that she is dead we should not suppose that there is some
truth, or some falsehood, about her that just happens to be forever outside
our epistemic reach. Rather, we know what it would have been like to be
entitled to the assertion, and so it is meaningful, but that does not license the
inference from (1) to (2). That inference would be licensed, by double negation
elimination, on a truth-value-realist’s semantic picture. But there is certainly
something deep and important about Dummett’s contention that the inference
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is suspicious. Surely, she was neither the one nor the other. But we speak-
ers of English are comfortable with explaining what kinds of (counterfactual)
circumstances would have entitled us to say that she was either courageous or
cowardly, in a certain situation. I think that the resonance of the argument
comes from an expectation of harmony, a property we expect to find among
our inferential practices and the structures they invoke. Understanding math-
ematical language and thought, with their putative entities and structures and
inferences, involves just the same machinery as any other portion of thought.
These involve the ability to fit ‘molecular’ semantic pieces into a wider net-
work of features, such as the evidence on which some proposition rests and
the consequences that flow from that proposition. This is what the harmony
at issue involves.
On this view, understanding any proposition p involves: (i) mastering at
least some of its appropriate contexts of use in the light of what other speakers
recognize as appropriate, (ii) the ability to draw out some of what follows from
it, (iii) the ability to transpose it into another appropriate context (e.g. when
a child hears a metaphor for the first time, and can display her understanding
or failure to understand that metaphor in her subsequent transposition of its
use to fresh contexts which are either appropriate or inappropriate), and (iv)
being able to adduce warrant for it. I know nothing about industrial chemistry,
but I know that gold dissolves in cyanide (and indeed that ‘Gold dissolves in
cyanide’ is T ↔ gold dissolves in cyanide). But if I go to a meeting of industrial
chemists, they will soon see that I don’t understand this proposition in any
real way because I can’t adduce evidence for it, I can’t draw any consequences
from it, and I can’t transpose it to any other relevantly similar circumstance.
I have no network into which to fit p: it has no harmonious position in my cog-
nitive equipment. In fact I have no interpretive structure which would afford
me the chance of being a participant in the practices that people who really
understand the proposition are capable of. Mathematical propositions, like
any other cluster of propositions, are located in a network of evidence (war-
rants) and consequences, which I need to master in order to master the relevant
portion of the language. I need substantially more than truth conditions for
just p alone: I also need its fit into a network of relevant collective practices
of use, giving and taking evidence, and consequence-drawing. The significant
insight to retain from Dummett is that engagement in mathematics (or of any
other portion of thought and language) is a skillful deployment of practical
abilities that cannot be represented as piecemeal, proposition-by-proposition
agglomeration.
But Dummett also defends a further thesis: that the right logic should
embody the single correct semantics, and so that we cannot ratify (for ex-
ample) DN-elimination in the logic, by the argument from the reflection on
courage given above. He defends the view that there is a unique correct logical
canon. We might style him a ‘practice monist’ in this respect. There is, how-
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ever, an apparent tension between the monistic thesis concerning inference,
and the harmony thesis, since if it’s the case that a practice constitutively de-
mands a harmonious interpretive structure, and given that classical mathemat-
ics grounded in classical logic is one of the most robust interpretive structures
there are, then the reformist project of monism conflicts directly with mature,
robust and harmonious practices. Since the proof-strategy of DN-elimination
is, furthermore, so pervasively operative over mathematical concepts that are
very robust indeed, and since it allows for so many transitions among robust
structures, there is very good reason to ratify it. Because such inferences
are authorized in number theory, for example, the transposition of a (per-
fectly legitimate) constraint from inferences about one target-domain—such
as states of character like courage—onto a quite different target-domain are
unwarranted, and jar with the expectation of harmony.
A rather different position vis-à-vis inferential practice in mathematics is
defended by Hartry Field (see, for instance, [Field 1998]), in whom we find a
strong ‘practice pluralism’. His famous slogan is that mathematics need not
be true to be good. Many ordinarily take truth to be a non-trivial property of
the class of uniquely warranted mathematical propositions by the strictures of
some monolithic canon. Not so for Field. The reasoning is as follows. There
are many canons, many alternative logics, and each one will deliver some differ-
ent inferences. A logical canon is like a licensing bureau, and different wickets
in the bureau will stamp your license in different ways to ratify some inferences
and prohibit others. The classical bureau will license the inference from (1) to
(2), but the intuitionistic bureau won’t allow it to go through. The classical
bureau will license you from (p and ∼ p) to q, but the window with Graham
Priest behind it (see [Priest 2006]) will let p and ∼ p both be true and not
license the inference to q, as he argues that we should not ratify ex falso (or ex
contradictione) quodlibet in the general case. Paraconsistent logic is comfort-
able with inconsistent arithmetic (e.g. [Mortensen 1995], [Mortensen 2009]),
while to classical logic, inconsistency is fatal. (Frege learned this the hard way.)
But now, we might ask in pluralist spirit, on what ground would you stand
from which you could further say ‘Classical logic is true, and a paraconsistent
system is false’, or vice versa? There is no such ground. Correctness, in the
case of mathematics, must just be consistency with the principles of a canon,
some canon or other. The only grounds for choice between canons, for choice
as to which window in the license bureau we walk up to, are either aesthetic or
pragmatic. Choosing between logics is not a matter of logical choice obedient
to some prior standard, nor a matter of discerning which is true. It might
be a matter of choosing what’s more beautiful, or picking what better serves
the interests of our empirical science: in essence, the choice of interpretive
structure, the selection of an appropriate practice in which to engage, is one
which is guided by the aims at hand, guided by the target-domain. But how
are we to characterize that domain, and the results about it?
Practice, Constraint, and Mathematical Concepts 21
2 The argument from constraint
The indispensability argument for mathematical realism, due in large part to
Quine and Putnam, is widely held to be the most promising candidate for es-
tablishing mathematical realism concerning the mathematical target-domain,
if such realism can be established at all. It’s also an argument that begins
with our practices as they weave together mathematics and natural science
into a conceptual whole. Yet it suffers from some significant problems. In the
following subsections I will begin by offering a different, and novel, argument
for realism concerning mathematical concepts, contrast it with the indispens-
ability argument, and reply to some potential objections while fleshing out the
argument further.
2.1 The argument in brief
It goes like this. One of three familiar ancient Greek construction problems in
geometry is the problem of squaring the circle (the two others are trisecting
the angle and doubling the cube). The problem is this:
(SC) Using only an unmarked straight-edge and compasses, and
given a circle of area A, construct a square having that same
area A.
Greek geometers struggled with this problem for a long time, as did many
mathematicians until the 19th century (mathematicians were similarly exer-
cised by the other problems too). It turns out that the construction demanded
in (SC) is, in fact, impossible, and we can prove it.
Suppose a circle of radius r. The area of a circle AC is given by the formula
AC = πr2. Now, let r = 1, to give us an arbitrary unit length. The area AS of
a square of side a is, of course, a2. This means that to construct AS = AC we
would need to construct a square with side a = √π.
This is what’s not possible. π is a transcendental number: this means that
it does not satisfy a polynomial equation (i.e. one of the form anxn+an−1xn−1+
. . .+a0 = 0). Now, polynomial equations operate exclusively with the functions
of addition, subtraction, multiplication and exponentiation: these are the op-
erations that can be geometrically constructed, that is, carried out in principle
with the tools set in (SC). But π does not satisfy any procedure that involves
just these operations: it is transcendental (the proof was given by Lindemann
in 1882 [Lindemann 1882]). The upshot is that there is no constructive geo-
metric ‘performance’, so to speak, by which we could accomplish the task set
in (SC). The transcendence of π means that we cannot turn one structure-
type into another by a certain pathway. So a purely mathematical property
furnishes an explanation of why something is impossible, an explanation of a
constraint on the possibilities that are within the ambit of our practice.
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In order better to see the force of the argument from constraint over the in-
dispensability argument (‘IA’, for short), I shall consider two points of contrast.
The first has to do with IA’s ultimate inability to derive its target conclusion
on the basis of premises that require mathematical objects’ explanatory role
to match the role of empirical postulates. The second point raises the ques-
tion of how one might argue for the actual satisfaction of mathematical truth
conditions. I raise each of these in turn.
2.2 A mismatch of roles
The general form of the indispensability argument for the existence of specifi-
cally mathematical abstract objects invokes their indispensability for empiri-
cal science. There is in fact so much mathematics included in the interpretive
structure of the natural science that the structure would crumble, and the
natural scientific practices become unintelligible, if the mathematics were re-
moved. I borrow the following formulation of the argument’s principal thesis
from Colyvan:
If apparent reference to some entity (or class of entities) ξ is indis-
pensable to our best scientific theories, then we ought to believe
in the existence of ξ. [Colyvan 2001, 7]
The idea might be cast like this: apparent reference, combined with indispens-
ability (in some sense to be made more precise) in the formulation of a body of
theory which we know on independent grounds to be true, secures reference.
Commitment to mathematical objects, by these lights, is the very same sort
of thing as commitment to quarks and other unobservable entities. If ‘quark’
appears to refer, and we cannot achieve the same scientific success without
reference to quarks as we can with such reference, then it is rational to believe
that ‘quark’ refers, even if it is only a provisional belief. In a similar vein,
if ‘the real line’ appears to refer, and we cannot achieve the same degree of
explanatory success in physics without the real line as we can with it, then it
is rational to believe that the expression refers. IA claims that mathematical
objects fill the same explanatory role as physical unobservables.
The argument’s fulcrum is the extent of the empirical support we can bring
on behalf of this thesis: that mathematics cannot, without loss of explanatory
content and disintegration of the interpretive structure, be paraphrased out of
empirical science. An IA of this kind is, then, an empirical hypothesis, to be
tested like any other against experience. In that vein, in a piece on behalf of
mathematical objects’ indispensability in natural science, Alan Baker [Baker
2005] raises the very interesting example of North American periodical cicadas
and the resources that need to be brought to bear on the explanation of their
life-cycle. Briefly, the case is this: in each of three species of cicada of the
Magicicada genus, ‘the nymphal stage remains in the soil for a lengthy period,
then the adult cicada emerges after either 13 years or 17 years depending on
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the geographical area’ [Baker 2005, 229]. That the life-cycle should fall into
a prime-numbered-year sequence is curious, and wants explaining. Baker can-
vasses two rather different biological explanations of why this is an evolution-
arily advantageous sequence, both of which, despite their differences, invoke
the number-theoretic fact that prime periods minimize intersection compared
to non-prime periods. (Exactly what they minimize intersection with is open
to interpretation, but Baker’s discussion of the phenomenon is uniform across
both of the interpretive versions he cites: see the references in his article.) In
any event, Baker writes:
[T]here are genuine mathematical explanations of physical phe-
nomena, and the explanation of the prime cycle lengths of peri-
odical cicadas using number theory is one example of such. If this
is right, then applying inference to the best explanation in the
cicada example yields the conclusion that numbers exist. [Baker
2005, 236]
Nevertheless, he continues,
Whatever cases of putative mathematical explanation the platon-
ist might come up with, there will always be some leeway for
nominalist objections since the role of mathematical posits is un-
likely ever to exactly match the role of concrete unobservables,
such as electrons. [Baker 2005, 236]
I think it’s helpful to cast Baker’s argument like this: since explanation is
achieved by invoking a property that is instantiated by nothing at all unless
it’s instantiated by an abstract object, the relevant abstract object is indis-
pensable to the explanation. A further feature of the empirical IA is that it sees
its criterion of success as the ability to locate cases in which the explanation
of contingent physical facts ineliminably involves reference to abstract objects,
whose existence is necessary if they exist at all. This opens up an opportunity
for the nominalist to drive a chisel into the interstitial explanatory space be-
tween concrete and abstract particulars, and then hammer off the abstracta,
perhaps by invoking an instrumentalist or fictionalist strategy, for instance in
the manner of Hartry Field [Field 1989], for whom the mathematics lubricates
inferences that it would otherwise be too clumsy to nominalize fully, but does
no more duty than that. Now, my claim is that while examples like Baker’s
cicadas are compelling up to a point, we are ultimately left with a mismatch
of explanatory role between mathematical and physical entities, a mismatch
which opponents of IA will exploit by pointing out that IA does not decide
the issue. (Note that the idea here is not so much that IA is false or fallacious,
but that it leaves the debate just where it started.)
But we can better make the mathematical realists’ case by reorienting
the focus of lines of argument from a practice-centred inference to the best
explanation—in which abstract objects emerge as posits on an ontological and
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epistemic par with physical unobservables—to an equally practice-centred in-
ference that will allow us to derive the explanation of a properly physical
and metaphysical impossibility. Rather than looking to what mathemati-
cal entities (of some kind to be made more precise) rule in, the argument
from constraint appeals to what they rule out. Mathematical entities don’t
need to match the role of concrete unobservables: they do a different kind
of duty, but explanatory duty nonetheless. The thrust of the argument from
constraint is to reveal rational grounds to endorse the existence of mathe-
matical entities of some kind, but grounds which, rather than appealing to
an empirical hypothesis about the functional role of such entities qua pos-
tulates, point instead to those entities’ status as necessary in circumscribing
the boundaries of the possible. These boundaries are laid bare by attend-
ing to what mathematical inference reveals about constraints which are both
intra-theoretic to the interpretive structure, and have purchase on the range
of what can actually be done.
2.3 The argument more fully
Mark Balaguer expresses this perfectly sensible demand: ‘platonists need to
argue that the platonistic truth conditions of our mathematical utterances are
actually satisfied ’ [Balaguer 2009, 133]. 2 The realist needs to adduce some
reasons for thinking that the conditions are satisfied by the right sort of thing.
What might these be? Here we can make an additional point on behalf of
the argument from constraint over the IA by way of an objection that teases
out some important points of contrast. The following objection, analogous
to Balaguer’s question, might be raised against my claims for the import of
constraint. If I host a party, and I run out of beer at a quarter past midnight,
my not being able to serve Emily a beer at twenty past midnight is explained
by my lack of beer, or by the dearth of beer in the fridge, or something along
those lines. But this explanation is not an explanation that commits me to
such things as dearths or lacks, as though they were objects. The proper
explanation of my inability to serve enough drinks will make no mention of
such an entity as a dearth of beer. Why suppose, then, that the explanatory
resources for the impossibility of (SC) will be any different from the resources
needed for the explanation of why Emily can’t have a beer?
My line of reply is this. There appear to be two fundamentally differ-
ent kinds of constraint invoked in these two scenarios, and two different cor-
responding kinds of explanation. My inability to serve enough drinks is a
contingent constraint, and that constraint is explained by causal features of
the situation. The relevant causal explanation will invoke contingent relations
between events. The impossibility of carrying out the (SC) construction, on
2. Balaguer raises this point in respect of platonism in contrast specifically to
mathematical fictionalism, but the challenge ought to generalize.
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the other hand, is not an event, since it does not unfold in space-time, and is
not open to causal explanation since the constraint expresses a metaphysical
impossibility. There is no possible world in which the (SC) construction can
be carried out, whereas there is obviously a possible world in which I have
more beer than I have at my party in this one. We might call the math-
ematical explanation of the constraint an essential explanation: one that is
necessary, and thus non-causal. Part of the argument from constraint’s bite
is that it points to a necessary property, instantiated in any metaphysically
possible world whatever. This particular necessity points in turn not just to
theoretical indispensability for natural science, but to metaphysical indispens-
ability in understanding a portion of the structure of possible worlds, this one
among them. The argument from constraint, then, is an argument from the
requirements of essential explanation to metaphysical indispensability in the
relevant interpretive structure, in which the relata of the explanation are not
contingent events.
Now, given the phenomenon of constraint, what can the argument from
that phenomenon teach us about the target-domain of the relevant portion
of mathematics, such as to explain how we are able to move from practice to
results concerning that domain? In other words, what underwrites the transi-
tion from practice to results in contexts such as those of essential explanation?
Several candidates suggest themselves, but I will argue that only one among
them is able to support the specific modal and explanatory features that must
be accommodated by a suitable account.
Objects, either concrete or abstract, can be rejected as candidates for pop-
ulating the target-domain. On the one hand, concrete objects are ipso facto
contingent, and so any properties which supervene upon them, or are emergent
from them, will be subject at most to physical rather than to logical or meta-
physical necessity. Concrete particulars do not provide support for inferences
across all possible worlds. Nor can concrete particulars, supposing them to
be the relevant target-domain, by themselves support inferences made on the
basis of mathematical induction. For instance, the unique prime factorization
theorem over the integers would be falsified for any number greater than what-
ever number of particulars there happens to be. On the other hand, abstract
objects, by the well-known arguments from Benacerraf, are equally untenable
as candidates, given that a determinate characterization of any number as
some particular set, or other kind of individual, is unavailable in principle
[Benacerraf 1965]. Multiple and structurally indiscriminable characterizations
are always at hand.
But this last observation suggests a further possible range of candidates:
concepts, rather than objects. For concepts can of course be multiply instan-
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tiated. 3 If this is the case, then what is the character of the concepts at issue
in the specifically mathematical target-domain of the practices involved in es-
sential explanation? On one proposal, such concepts are to be understood as
either akin to instrumental idealizations which are used in the natural sciences
for modelling real systems—ideal gasses, for example, or treating fluids as con-
tinuous rather than discrete substances in fluid dynamics—or else as akin to
the concepts used in fictional storytelling. On this proposal, the target-domain
of mathematical practice is something other, which wears mathematics as a
mask. It is really, on this view, the material world, or a pseudo-world of free
imaginative creation, which is the target-domain. But this cannot be right,
if we reflect on the phenomenon of constraint as it has been described here.
For if the material world is the target-domain of mathematical practice, then
there is no support for inferences concerning trans-world impossibilities; and
if a pseudo-world of our imaginative creation is our real target, then the ex-
planatory purchase of what I have called ‘essential explanation’ is lost. And
so I propose that what does the work of extracting results from mathematical
practice is in fact the relevant range of concepts themselves, understood as real
at least in the sense of not being mere representations of something else (for
there is nothing else that they can plausibly represent), and in the further sense
that the structure of the concepts determines the appropriateness or inappro-
priateness of our thought about them, and the consequent practices by which
we engage with them, rather than the other way around. 4 The order of ex-
planation appropriate to an account of mathematical correctness and the con-
tent of mathematical thought begins with concepts as their content and struc-
ture are worked out over time, and only then looks to whether the connected
practices—practices of inference in particular, of consequence-extraction—are
such as to represent the rational transitions to which we are entitled in virtue
of the concept, which is gradually more fully understood. In the context of
the argument from constraint proposed above, the transcendental number
concept determines the content of a constellation of thoughts about π and fur-
ther determines the explanatory reach of those thought-contents with respect
to the range of what is and what is not possible.
3. Individual concepts such as the ones expressed by proper names are an exception
to multiple instantiation, but the Benacerraf argument shows that, if numbers are not
individuals, number concepts are by the same token not individual concepts either.
4. In the light of these considerations I think that Daniel Isaacson [Isaacson 1994]
is perhaps closest to the truth in invoking what he calls ‘concept platonism’. For con-
cepts as determiners of thoughts do triple duty: first, unlike platonic particulars, they
are multiply instantiable and thus constant across isomorphic structures that serve to
fill their place-holders; second, they are constraining in virtue of possessing necessary
structural relations to each other; and thirdly, following from these first two features,
they are explanatory in the requisite sense of furnishing essential explanations.
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Conclusion
A quick summary of the argument is in order. I suggested first that we can
characterize mature practices of almost any kind along three dimensions: that
they have meaning and can be individuated by virtue of being encompassed
under a system of interpretive concepts; that they affect the mental state,
specifically the first-personal self-conception, of participants; and that third-
personal recognition of participants as such is available. But in addition to
these, mathematics, among other practices, is also a discipline that seeks the
truth, but the target-domain in which these truths are sought by means of
mathematical practices is unique—or very nearly—in not being available for
sensory examination. So what is that domain? Methodologically speaking, we
need to examine some features of mathematical practices themselves, multiple
practices of inference in particular, so as to corner the results in our target-
domain, and here we find (retaining this insight from Field) that practices of
inference are adjusted in the light of what interests happen to be guiding inves-
tigation, in the light of what kinds of results are sought. But nevertheless, the
exact character of the target-domain of pure mathematics is worth inquiring
into, and while I have argued that some form of realism is required, it cannot
be the object-realism espoused by defenders of the indispensability argument.
Nonetheless, realism is required in order that we may account for the transition
from, in my example, pure mathematical practices to their genuinely explana-
tory outcomes (an essential explanation, in the vocabulary arising from the
argument from constraint). I further argued that only real concepts are suited
to the multi-faceted task of moving from practice to results.
Practices are always-already there, so to speak, but they are good or bad
in relation to concepts antecedent in the order of explanation when it comes
to phenomena such as constraint. 5 Concepts are not generated by practice in
the general case; practices are instead measured for their worth in relation to
the concepts that are their target-domain. Inferential policies are responsible
to concepts: hence the explanation of constraint. I have sought to motivate
reconnecting the target-domain of a portion of mathematics not just with its
internal structure of operation as a practice, but as a discipline whose subject
matter that is importantly practice-determining. The argument has proceeded
by pointing to what is ruled out. In my example, what is ruled out is not ruled
out by practices taken by themselves, but rather by (in this specific case) the
transcendental number concept. Squaring the circle is not ruled out by
our ways of doing, but by what we find as limits at the outskirts of our doings.
5. A related point, especially concerning infinite structures, is made in Corfield
[Corfield 2010].
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